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ONE OF THESE THINGS IS NOT LIKE THE 
OTHER: NAACP V. ALABAMA IS NOT A 
MANUAL FOR POWERFUL, WEALTHY 
SPENDERS TO POUR UNLIMITED SECRET 
MONEY INTO OUR POLITICAL PROCESS 
ERIN CHLOPAK* 
In Citizens United, eight of the Supreme Court’s nine Justices reaffirmed the 
Court’s earlier decisions holding that election-related transparency laws are 
constitutional. Those eight Justices agreed that voters have a right to know who is 
paying for pre-election ads that mention candidates—“[e]ven if the ads only pertain 
to a commercial transaction.” And they recognized that election spending 
“transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper 
weight to different speakers and messages.” 
In the near decade since Citizens United was decided, lower courts have invoked 
the decision to uphold a wide range of federal and state disclosure laws, rejecting 
arguments urging a narrow interpretation of the decision. And the Supreme Court 
has declined subsequent requests to revisit its disclosure holding. In fact, the Court’s 
determination that disclosure requirements are constitutional was critical to the 
other part of Citizens United, in which a five-Justice majority invalidated the ban 
on independent, corporate-funded election expenditures. The Court held that 
disclosure is a “less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of 
speech” and predicted the decision would usher in a new “campaign finance 
system that pairs corporate independent expenditures with effective disclosure.” 
 
 * Director of Campaign Finance Strategy, Campaign Legal Center. I am deeply 
grateful to Aseem Mulji and Maggie Christ for their invaluable contributions to this 
Article and to Solomon Miller for his helpful work on the early stages of this piece. 
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Decisions from Buckley (1976) to Citizens United (2010) have continued 
to recognize a singular, limited as-applied disclosure exemption for groups 
facing a “reasonable probability” of threats, harassment, or reprisals. 
Historically, that exemption has been reserved for vulnerable groups like the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 
1950s Alabama—organizations whose members faced violent retribution if their 
names were disclosed. 
As attempts to invalidate or limit election-related disclosure laws have failed, well-
funded dark money organizations are now seeking a back-door approach—claiming 
the narrow NAACP exemption for their own anti-transparency objectives. These new 
efforts generally ignore the factual context for which the NAACP exemption was 
recognized. They also dismiss the Supreme Court’s recognition that election-related 
disclosure rules promote the First Amendment rights of American voters to be 
informed about who is trying to influence their electoral decisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Citizens United v. FEC,1 eight of the Supreme Court’s nine Justices 
reaffirmed decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence holding that 
election-related transparency laws are constitutional. Those eight 
Justices recognized that disclosure of election expenditures “enables 
the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to 
different speakers and messages,” while also providing citizens with 
important information necessary to hold elected officials accountable.2 
The Justices agreed that voters have a right to know who is paying for 
pre-election ads that mention candidates, even if the ads do not 
explicitly advocate for or against the candidate’s election.3 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion predicted that the Court’s 
disclosure holding, combined with the more controversial part of 
Citizens United, in which a five-Justice majority invalidated the ban on 
independent corporate- and union-funded election expenditures, 
would usher in a new “campaign finance system that pairs corporate 
independent expenditures with effective disclosure.”4 That prediction 
could not have been more off-base. While corporate election spending 
has surely been on the rise, existing laws do not come close to ensuring 
“effective disclosure,” and ongoing efforts seek to make the election 
transparency regime even less effective. 
 
 1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 369–71. 
 3. Id. at 370–71. 
 4. Id. at 369–70. 
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In particular, anti-transparency advocates and others who prefer to 
influence our politics in secret are pursing litigation, policy, and public 
advocacy campaigns to create a mechanism to influence the political 
process in secret, elevating political spenders’ preference for anonymity 
over the well-established right of citizens to make informed decisions at 
the ballot box. These efforts seek a dramatic expansion of a narrow, as-
applied disclosure exemption generally reserved for vulnerable groups 
like the NAACP in Jim Crow Alabama or the Socialist Workers Party 
during the early 1980s—organizations that lacked substantial political and 
economic power and whose members faced violent retribution if their 
names were disclosed. Recent efforts to invoke that exemption as a basis 
for avoiding or negating disclosure rules generally ignore the factual 
context for which the exemption was originally recognized. Anti-
transparency advocates also dismiss the Supreme Court’s recognition that 
election-related disclosure rules are uniquely important because they 
promote American voters’ First Amendment right to be informed about 
who is trying to influence their electoral decisions.5 
This Article surveys the variety of strategies that powerful, anti-
transparency advocates are employing to undermine election-
spending transparency laws and co-opt the disclosure exemption for 
marginalized groups facing serious threats and harassment. First, it 
traces the history of the Supreme Court’s campaign finance disclosure 
decisions, which have uniformly upheld transparency requirements for 
spending on election-related advocacy. Second, it describes the origins 
of the disclosure exemption for vulnerable groups like the NAACP in 
the 1950s—groups whose members faced serious threats, harassment, 
or retaliation if identified and for whom disclosure thus compromised 
the exercise of First Amendment associational rights. It also explains 
how the Supreme Court and lower courts have applied this “NAACP 
exemption” in the context of election transparency laws. Third, it 
surveys recent efforts to diminish election spending transparency by 
distorting the NAACP exemption through litigation, policy reforms, 
and in public discourse. Finally, it explains how the current legal 
landscape already enables extensive evasion of existing campaign 
finance disclosure laws and it is thus more important now than ever to 
prevent efforts to misappropriate the NAACP exemption and 
transform it into a loophole that undermines citizens’ rights to make 
informed electoral choices. 
 
 5. Id. at 366–69, 371. 
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I.    TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENTS ADVANCE FIRST AMENDMENT 
INTERESTS AND ARE A CRUCIAL TOOL FOR PREVENTING SECRET 
ELECTION SPENDING FROM UNDERMINING OUR DEMOCRACY 
Informing citizens about the sources of money spent to influence 
elections is foundational to the American system of self-government.6 As 
the Supreme Court explained in Citizens United, “[t]he right of citizens to 
inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a 
precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to 
protect it.”7 Citizens cannot fully and effectively participate in the political 
process unless they have access to information about who supports which 
positions and why. Access to that information is also necessary to hold 
elected officials accountable, and to ensure officeholders remain 
responsive to the public. These principles underlie the Supreme Court’s 
campaign finance disclosure decisions, which collectively embrace 
transparency about election-related spending as a constitutionally 
permissible and effective means of protecting citizens’ First Amendment 
rights to make “informed choices in the political marketplace.”8 
A.   The Supreme Court Has Long Recognized the Democratic Value of 
Election-Spending Transparency 
The first federal campaign finance disclosure law was passed in 19109 and 
expanded in 1925.10 The law was weak and widely circumvented, though it 
survived a lawsuit claiming that it infringed the power of the states.11 
Congress, the Supreme Court held, may “pass appropriate legislation to 
 
 6. Cf. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (noting that free 
discussion of ideas and speech is crucial to self-government). 
 7. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339. 
 8. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003), partially abrogated by Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 363–65 (2010) (striking down the federal ban on 
corporate-funded independent expenditures and electioneering communications, 
which had been upheld in McConnell). Although Citizens United abrogated one part of 
the Court’s earlier decision in McConnell, most important for purposes of this article 
was the Citizens United Court’s reaffirmance, by an eight-Justice majority, of the 
constitutionality of the federal transparency requirements for such spending. Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 366–71. 
 9. Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-274, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822 (repealed 1971). 
 10. Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, §§ 301–319, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925). 
 11. See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) (declaring it within 
Congress’s power to pass legislation designed to protect presidential elections from 
corruption and requiring the public disclosure of political contributions to further 
that goal); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 62 (1976) (per curiam). 
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safeguard [a Presidential] election from the improper use of money to 
influence the result.”12 
Most of the statutory framework governing money in politics today 
was enacted as part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
(FECA), and its amendments in 1974.13 FECA’s early provisions broadly 
regulated “all money spent ‘in connection with’ or ‘for the purpose of 
influencing’ federal elections.”14 The statute included limitations on 
political contributions to federal candidates, public disclosure of 
contributions above a threshold, public funding for Presidential 
candidates, and the creation of a Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
to enforce the laws.15 
When FECA was challenged in court, it resulted in a 1976 Supreme 
Court decision that continues to govern the constitutional parameters 
for how courts analyze a range of campaign finance requirements. In 
Buckley v. Valeo,16 the Supreme Court generally upheld federal 
transparency rules for political contributions and expenditures, while 
striking down monetary limits on those expenditures.17 
The Court acknowledged the First Amendment implications of 
FECA’s original disclosure requirements,18 but explained that unlike 
 
 12. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 545. 
 13. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) 
(amended 1974). 
 14. Trevor Potter & Kirk L. Jowers, The Frequently Mischaracterized Impact of the Courts 
on the FEC and Campaign Finance Law, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 839, 840 (2002). 
 15. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7 (summarizing FECA’s early provisions). 
 16. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 17. Id. at 23, 29, 35, 39, 51. 
 18. FECA originally imposed expenditure limits and reporting requirements on 
independent expenditures “relative to a clearly identified candidate.” Id. at 39 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)). In reviewing the 
constitutionality of those provisions in Buckley, the Court adopted a narrowing 
construction of “expenditure” to avoid vagueness and overbreadth problems. Id. at 40–
44, 80. Under Buckley, federal disclosure requirements for independent expenditures 
applied only to “expenditures for communications that in express terms advocate the 
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office.” Id. at 44. Decades 
later, the Court clarified that its so-called “express advocacy” limitation was a “product 
of statutory interpretation”—to avoid constitutional problems of vagueness and 
overbreadth—“rather than a constitutional command.” McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 
93, 192 (2003), partially abrogated by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). That 
clarification was key to the Court’s subsequent decisions upholding legislation that 
extended disclosure requirements to a broader range of communications, including 
commercial ads that merely mention a candidate and are broadcast shortly before an 
election. See infra Sections I.B.–C. 
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limits on contributions and expenditures, disclosure requirements 
“impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities.”19 Disclosure laws 
are thus constitutionally permissible when there is a “substantial 
relation” between the information required to be disclosed and a 
“sufficiently important” government interest.20 This intermediate 
standard of constitutional scrutiny—which is less demanding than the 
“strict scrutiny” standard that applies to political expenditure 
restrictions—is often called “exacting scrutiny.”21 The Buckley Court 
identified three “sufficiently important” government interests that 
election-related disclosure laws advance: (1) allowing voters to better 
evaluate candidates for federal office; (2) deterring corruption and the 
appearance of corruption; and (3) detecting other campaign finance 
violations, such as circumvention of FECA’s contribution limits or its 
ban on foreign interference in American elections.22 
In Buckley, the Court held that FECA’s disclosure requirements were 
substantially related to these important government interests and thus 
outweighed concerns about potentially infringing the exercise of First 
Amendment rights, “particularly when the ‘free functioning of our 
national institutions’ is involved.”23 
Since Buckley, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the 
constitutional permissibility—and democratic value—of requiring 
transparency in the context of electoral advocacy. Just two years after 
Buckley, the Court upheld transparency requirements in the context of 
ballot initiative elections and recognized that identifying who is behind 
advertising for ballot measures enables “the people . . . to evaluate the 




 19. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64. 
 20. Id. at 64–66. 
 21. See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010) (“We have a series of precedents 
considering First Amendment challenges to disclosure requirements in the electoral 
context. These precedents have reviewed such challenges under what has been termed 
‘exacting scrutiny[,]’” which “requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure 
requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest”). 
 22. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–68. 
 23. Id. at 66 (quoting Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 
U.S. 1, 97 (1961)). 
 24. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978). 
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B.   The Court in McConnell Recognized that Secret Election Spending 
Harms Citizens’ First Amendment Rights 
A couple decades after Buckley, the Court revisited the 
constitutionality of political reporting and disclaimer requirements in 
the context of a challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 
2002 (BCRA).25 BCRA, popularly known as the McCain-Feingold Act, 
was, in part, Congress’s response to the growing problem of 
independent groups who run election-related advertisements “while 
hiding behind dubious and misleading names.”26 The Act extended FEC 
reporting requirements and “disclaimer” rules—disclaimers must 
provide information on the face of an ad about who paid for it and 
whether it is authorized by a candidate27—for pre-election ads that 
mention a candidate and are broadcast in the jurisdiction where that 
candidate is running for office.28 BCRA’s transparency provisions 
required organizations to reveal the sources of money used to pay for 
these “electioneering communication[s]”29 so that the public could 
properly evaluate the election ads flooding the airways. 
Senator Mitch McConnell and other plaintiffs claimed those 
requirements violated their First Amendment rights, but in McConnell 
v. FEC, eight Justices firmly disagreed.30 As the Court recounted, the 
record in the case reflected that corporations and labor unions had 
been funding broadcast advertisements “designed to influence federal 
elections . . . while concealing their identities from the public.”31 
Advertisements ran under misleading names like: “‘The Coalition-
Americans Working for Real Change’ (funded by business organizations 
opposed to organized labor), ‘Citizens for Better Medicare’ (funded by 
the pharmaceutical industry), ‘Republicans for Clean Air’ (funded by 
brothers Charles and Sam Wyly).”32 
“Given these tactics,” the Court questioned “how ‘uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open’ speech can occur when organizations hide themselves 
 
 25. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
52 U.S.C. §§ 10101–30101 (2012)). 
 26. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003). 
 27. 52 U.S.C. § 30120(a), (c)–(d) (2012); 11 C.F.R. § 110.11 (2006). 
 28. 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104(f), 30120. 
 29. Id. § 30104(f). 
 30. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 120–21. 
 31. Id. at 196 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 237 (D.D.C. 2003) 
(three-judge court)). 
 32. Id. at 197 (quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 237). 
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from the scrutiny of the voting public.”33 BCRA’s transparency 
requirements are not only constitutionally permissible, the Court held, they 
affirmatively promote the “First Amendment interests of individual citizens 
seeking to make informed choices in the political marketplace.”34 
C.   Citizens United Confirms the First Amendment Value of Election-
Spending Transparency Laws 
In 2010, the Supreme Court once again revisited the question of 
whether, and to what extent, election-spending transparency 
requirements are permissible under the First Amendment.35 To be 
sure, Citizens United is best known for the part of the opinion in which 
five Justices held that corporations and unions have a First 
Amendment right to spend unlimited amounts of their general 
treasury funds to influence elections.36 But Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion explicitly linked that controversial holding to another part of 
the opinion in which eight Justices reaffirmed the Court’s holding in 
McConnell that requiring transparency of the sources of paid political 
speech promotes First Amendment interests.37 
Citizens United is a § 501(c)(4) nonprofit corporation that wanted 
to pay a cable company to distribute through video on demand a film 
about then Secretary of State and presidential candidate Hillary 
Clinton.38 It also wanted to run on television a series of short 
advertisements promoting its film.39 In claiming that BCRA’s reporting 
and on-ad disclaimer requirements violated the organization’s First 
Amendment rights, Citizens United urged the Supreme Court to 
broadly hold that BCRA’s disclosure requirements must be confined 
to ads that expressly advocate for or against candidates.40 The group 
also suggested that its short promotional advertisements—some of 
which were just ten seconds long—should be exempt from disclosure 
 
 33. Id. (quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 237). 
 34. Id. (quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 237). 
 35. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). 
 36. Id. at 363–65. 
 37. Id. at 366–71. 
 38. See Video on Demand (VoD), TECHOPEDIA (Apr. 26, 2013), https://www. 
techopedia.com/definition/25650/video-on-demand-vod [https://perma.c c/V 3P6-
L9UP] (defining Video on Demand as “a system that allows users to select and watch 
video content of their choice on their TVs or computers”). 
 39. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320. 
 40. Id. at 368–69. 
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requirements because they “only attempt[ed] to persuade viewers to 
see [its] film,” and should not be construed as electioneering.41 
The Court rejected both arguments and reaffirmed its holding in 
McConnell that transparency laws advance First Amendment interests, 
including when applied to Citizens United’s short movie ads.42 The Court 
explained that prompt disclosure of election spending provides citizens 
with information necessary to hold elected officials “accountable for their 
positions and supporters” and to “see whether elected officials are ‘in the 
pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests.”43 The Court explained that the 
public’s “informational interest alone is sufficient to justify” application of 
BCRA’s transparency requirements “[e]ven if the ads only pertain to a 
commercial transaction” because transparency accords the electorate the 
opportunity to give proper weight to different speakers and messages.44 
In the decade since it was decided, lower courts have applied Citizens United 






 41. Id. at 369. 
 42. Id. at 368–70. 
 43. Id. at 369. 
 44. Id. at 369. 
 45. See, e.g., Indep. Inst. v. Williams, 812 F.3d 787, 799 (10th Cir. 2016); Del. Strong 
Families v. Attorney Gen. of Del., 793 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2015); Justice v. 
Hosemann, 771 F.3d 285, 301 (5th Cir. 2014); Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 
758 F.3d 118, 145 (2d Cir. 2014); Free Speech v. FEC, 720 F.3d 788, 798 (10th Cir. 
2013); Worley v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 717 F.3d 1238, 1255 (11th Cir. 2013); Real Truth 
About Abortion, Inc. v. FEC, 681 F.3d 544, 558 (4th Cir. 2012); Ctr. for Individual 
Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 499 (7th Cir. 2012); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. 
McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 72 (1st Cir. 2011); Human Life of Wash. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 
990, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010); SpeechNOW.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(en banc). But see Ams. for Prosperity v. Grewal, No. 3:19-cv-14228-BRM-LHG, 2019 
WL 4855853, at *20 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2019) (preliminarily enjoining New Jersey’s broad 
donor disclosure requirements for groups that spend money to influence elections or 
to simply provide political information on election issues); Citizens Union of N.Y. v. 
Attorney Gen. of N.Y., 408 F. Supp. 3d 478, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (invalidating New 
York’s broad ethics reform legislation, which imposed public donor disclosure 
requirements on non-profit charities that donated to social welfare non-profits). 
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II.    THE SUPREME COURT HAS RECOGNIZED A LIMITED, AS-APPLIED 
DISCLOSURE EXEMPTION FOR VULNERABLE GROUPS THAT REASONABLY 
FEAR SERIOUS THREATS AND HARASSMENT 
In Buckley, McConnell, and Citizens United, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the government’s interest in ensuring citizens are able 
to make informed electoral choices outweighed concerns about the 
alleged burdens that disclosure requirements would impose on the 
plaintiffs’ political advocacy. While upholding the transparency 
requirements challenged in those cases, each opinion recognized that 
a future as-applied challenge to a disclosure law remains available to a 
group that “could show a ‘reasonable probability’ that disclosure of its 
contributors’ names ‘will subject them to threats, harassment, or 
reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.’”46 
That standard originated in a pair of earlier cases involving 
constitutional challenges to laws in 1950s Alabama and Arkansas at a time 
of deep political unrest and violence. These challenges arose in the early 
days of the modern Civil Rights Movement against laws that required the 
NAACP to provide government officials with lists of NAACP members.47 
As described below, those cases were decided on a thorough record 
cataloguing serious threats, violence, and other harassment.48 
 A.   Origin of the “NAACP Exemption” 
In 1956, the Alabama Secretary of State required the NAACP to disclose 
the names and addresses of all of its members in the state, pursuant to 
Alabama’s regulation of foreign corporations.49 Fearing for the safety of its 
members, the NAACP refused and was held in contempt by Alabama state 
courts.50 The organization petitioned for review in the United States 
 
 46. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 367 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 544 U.S. 93, 198 
(2003)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam). 
 47. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 451, 462–63 (1958) 
(concluding that an Alabama mandate compelling the NAACP to disclose the 
identities of its members would likely entail “a substantial restraint upon the exercise 
by [NAACP] members of their right to freedom of association” in light of the 
organization’s uncontroverted showing of economic reprisals, loss of employment, 
and threats of violence against NAACP members). 
 48. See infra Section II.A. 
 49. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 452–53 (outlining the allegations in the suit the 
Attorney General brought to force the NAACP to disclose its members’ information). 
 50. Id. at 451. 
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Supreme Court, asserting that Alabama’s disclosure requirement violated 
its members’ First Amendment rights of free association.51 
The Supreme Court agreed with the NAACP: black civil rights 
activists in the southern states faced such severe threats that a 
requirement to publicly identify their names and addresses would 
likely deter them from remaining or becoming members of the 
organization.52 The record included threats directed at schools where 
African-American students were attempting to enroll; bombings and 
shootings directed against buses, homes of African-American leaders 
and ministers, black taxi stands, and black churches; and Ku Klux Klan 
demonstrations and cross burnings.53 
The Court concluded that Alabama’s disclosure mandate, in light of 
the record presented by the NAACP, posed “the likelihood of a 
substantial restraint upon the exercise by [its] members of their right 
to freedom of association” by inducing some members to withdraw 
from the organization and dissuading others from joining because of 
 
 51. See id. at 451, 453–54 (setting forth the NAACP’s constitutional arguments in 
defense of nondisclosure). 
 52. Id. at 462–63; see also Dale E. Ho, NAACP v. Alabama and False Symmetry in the 
Disclosure Debate, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 405, 409–11 (2012) (describing the 
factual context in which the NAACP v. Alabama case arose). 
 53. Although the Supreme Court’s opinion omits the details, the brief for the 
NAACP cites numerous specific examples, including the following: 
• a year-long series of bombings and shootings of African-American leaders in the 
bus segregation issue; 
• nine bombings and ten shootings directed against buses or the homes of 
African-American leaders; 
• the bombing of the home of Rev. F.L. Shuttlesworth, an African-American 
leader of the bus boycott; 
• the bombing of four Black churches, homes of two ministers who were both 
leaders in the bus boycott, and a Black taxi stand, as well as the attempted 
bombing of the home of Rev. M.L. King; and 
• false bombing reports at Phillips High School and student demonstrations at 
Woodland High School following reports that African-American students 
would attempt to enroll at these schools. 
Brief for Petitioner, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (No. 91), 
1957 WL 55387, at *16 n.12. Dale Ho, former Assistant Counsel of the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund and current Director of the American Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU) 
Voting Rights Project, observed that, “[a]lthough the Court did not discuss the larger 
social context in its decision, it seems implausible that the violent reprisals that faced 
civil rights activists at the time were not in the minds of the Justices when this case was 
decided.” Ho, supra note 52, at 414–15. 
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fear of the consequences of being publicly associated with it.54 It 
further found that Alabama’s purpose—“to determine whether [the 
NAACP] was conducting intrastate business in violation of the Alabama 
foreign corporation registration statute”—was not “sufficient to overcome 
[the NAACP’s] constitutional objections.”55 
The Supreme Court considered a similar case two years later. In Bates v. 
City of Little Rock,56 the cities of Little Rock and North Little Rock, Arkansas 
mandated disclosure of the local NAACP’s membership list as part of their 
new tax laws.57 The NAACP again refused and challenged the requirements 
in court, invoking evidence of harassment, threats of violence, and economic 
reprisals against NAACP members, and arguing that public disclosure of 
membership would interfere with the freedom of association of NAACP 
members.58 As it had found with respect to Alabama’s requirements, the 
Court concluded that “the threat of substantial government encroachment 
upon important and traditional aspects of individual freedom [wa]s neither 
speculative nor remote.”59 It also found “no relevant correlation” between the 
municipalities’ taxing power and the ordinances requiring local NAACP 
branches to disclose and publish their membership lists.60 
In both cases, the Supreme Court engaged in a two-part analysis. 
First, the Court found that disclosure of NAACP member information 
would likely lead to the same kinds of actual and threatened violence 
and serious harassment that had already been well documented.61 
Second, the Court found that the government interests underlying the 
Alabama and Little Rock disclosure requirements were insufficiently 
important to overcome the harm that the requirements would likely cause 
to the First Amendment associational rights of the NAACP and its 
members.62 As described below, courts have rarely reached similar 
conclusions in the electoral context, where transparency requirements 
serve important government interests and where, for the most part, the 
anticipated harm from disclosure is nowhere near as extensive or severe. 
 
 54. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462–63. 
 55. Id. at 464–65. 
 56. 361 U.S. 516 (1960). 
 57. Id. at 517. 
 58. Id. at 524. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 525. 
 61. See id. at 523–24; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958). 
 62. See Bates, 361 U.S. at 525–27; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 465–66. 
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B.   The NAACP Exemption in the Context of Electoral Transparency Laws 
The Supreme Court first considered how the NAACP exemption 
applies to election-related disclosure requirements in Buckley. The Court 
acknowledged that “public disclosure of contributions to candidates and 
political parties will deter some individuals who might otherwise 
contribute” and “[i]n some instances, disclosure may even expose 
contributors to harassment or retaliation,” but it observed that in the 
distinct context of campaign finance transparency, “disclosure 
requirements—certainly in most applications—appear to be the least 
restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and 
corruption that Congress found to exist.”63 The Court further 
recognized that “there are governmental interests sufficiently 
important to outweigh the possibility of infringement, particularly 
when the ‘free functioning of national institutions’ is involved.’”64 
Given the importance of an informed electorate, as well as the 
anticorruption and law enforcement interests served by campaign 
finance transparency requirements, the Court refused to grant a 
blanket disclosure exemption for minor political parties.65 Instead, it 
recognized the availability of as-applied relief where “the type of chill 
and harassment identified in NAACP v. Alabama can be shown.”66 The 
Court clarified that a party “need show only a reasonable probability 
that compelled disclosure of a party’s contributors’ names will subject 
them to threats, harassment, or reprisals,” and explained that relevant 
proof “may include, for example, specific evidence of past or present 
harassment of members due to their associational ties, or of 
harassment directed against the organization itself.”67 
A few years later, the Court revisited the applicability of the NAACP 
exemption in the electoral context when the Socialist Workers Party 
(SWP) challenged the State of Ohio’s campaign finance disclosure 
requirements. Ohio’s laws would have required SWP, as a political 
party, to disclose the names and addresses of campaign contributors 
 
 63. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976) (per curiam). 
 64. Id. at 66. 
 65. Id. at 74. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.; see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 198 (2003) (“In Buckley, unlike NAACP, we 
found no evidence that any party had been exposed to economic reprisals or physical 
threats as a result of the compelled disclosures. We acknowledged that such a case might 
arise in the future, however, and addressed the standard of proof that would then 
apply.” (citation omitted)). 
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and recipients of campaign disbursements.68 The record included 
examples of “threatening phone calls and hate mail, the burning of 
SWP literature, the destruction of SWP members’ property, police 
harassment of a party candidate, and the firing of shots at an SWP 
office.”69 In addition, the Court cited “evidence that in the 12-month 
period before trial 22 SWP members, including 4 in Ohio, were fired 
because of their party membership,”70 while private hostility made it 
hard for members to find employment.71 The record also showed that 
the FBI had been surveilling and disrupting SWP operations for years, 
including during the commencement of the lawsuit.72 
The Supreme Court invoked Buckley’s analysis of NAACP and 
considered both the probability of harm to SWP members and the 
importance of the state’s interest in disclosure. It found “substantial 
evidence of both governmental and private hostility toward and 
harassment of SWP members and supporters.”73 It also found that as a 
“small” political party with only about sixty members in Ohio and “little 
success at the polls,”74 SWP was unlikely to play a major role in politics 
or policy, rendering the state’s interest in disclosure relatively low.75 
The Court thus concluded that the balance tipped in favor of 
exempting SWP from Ohio’s disclosure requirements.76 
After Brown, the SWP sought and obtained an extension of its 
campaign finance reporting exemption through the Federal Election 
Commission’s advisory opinion process. A series of five successive 
advisory opinions effectively extended the reporting exemption that 
SWP had obtained through the Brown litigation for more than 30 years, 
through December 31, 2016.77 But when SWP sought a new advisory 
 
 68. Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982). 
 69. Id. at 99. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 91. 
 74. Id. at 88. 
 75. Id. at 95. 
 76. Id. at 102. 
 77. FEC, ADVISORY OPINION 2012-38 (Apr. 25, 2013), https://www.fec.gov/files/l 
egal/aos/2012-38/AO-2012-38.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RCB-JKQZ]; FEC, ADVISORY 
OPINION 2009-01 (Mar. 20, 2009), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2009-01/AO-
2009-01-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AHA-Z834]; FEC, ADVISORY OPINION 2003-02 
(Apr. 4, 2003), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2003-02/2003-02.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/YEC4-AB59]; FEC, ADVISORY OPINION 1996-46 (Mar. 11, 1997), https:// 
www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/1996-46/1996-46.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJ4E-72LY]; 
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opinion further extending the exemption beyond 2016, FEC 
Commissioners in a divided vote declined to approve the request.78 
SWP’s exemption thus expired at the end of that year. Commissioners 
who voted against extending SWP’s disclosure exemption noted the 
party’s increased electoral and fundraising success, found that the 
evidence submitted by SWP “demonstrates that harassment of the SWP’s 
supporters has steadily decreased over the years since its disclosure 
exemption was first granted,” and concluded that this recent evidence 
“does not indicate a reasonable probability that serious harassment and 
reprisals are likely to be inflicted on SWP supporters.”79 The FEC has not 
issued any other advisory opinions exempting a group from federal 
campaign finance transparency requirements.80 
Nor has the Supreme Court, since Brown, found sufficient evidence 
of probable threats or harassment to overcome the government’s 
substantial interests in transparent elections.81 In McConnell, the Court 
distinguished the record before the Court from the record in Brown, 
agreeing with the district court that while some parties had expressed 
harassment concerns, there was a “lack of specific evidence about the 
basis for these concerns.”82 In Citizens United, the Court similarly 
referenced “recent events in which donors to certain causes were 
blacklisted, threatened, or otherwise targeted for retaliation.”83 The 
Court expressed “concern” about these examples, but nevertheless 
rejected Citizens United’s challenge to BCRA’s transparency 
requirements, citing a lack of any evidence that Citizens United or its 
 
FEC, ADVISORY OPINION 1990-13 (Aug. 21, 1990), https://www.fec.gov/f iles/legal/ 
aos/1990-13/1990-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/AW64-58WE]. 
 78. FEC, ADVISORY OPINION REQUEST 2016-23 (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.fec.gov 
/files/legal/aos/2016-23/2016-23.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV42-YU2T]. 
 79. FEC, ADVISORY OPINION 2016-23 (SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY) DRAFT B (Mar. 8, 
2017), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2016-23/201623_1.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/GEM3-WJBZ]; see FEC, VOTE CERTIFICATION (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.fec.gov/ 
files/legal/aos/2016-23/201623V_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6XB-VEQY] (reflecting 
vote of two Commissioners in support of Draft B). 
 80. In one other instance, in 2013, the Commission, through another divided vote, 
declined to grant a request by the Tea Party Leadership Fund. FEC, ADVISORY OPINION 
REQUEST 2013-17 (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2013-17/AO-
2013-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK3E-YGQ8]. 
 81. As described infra Section II.C, lower courts have followed the Supreme 
Court’s guidance and construed the NAACP exemption narrowly. 
 82. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 199 (2003) (citing McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. 
Supp. 2d 176, 247 (D.D.C. 2003) (three-judge court)). 
 83. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370. 
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members were likely to face similar threats and observing, “[t]o the 
contrary, Citizens United has been disclosing its donors for years and 
has identified no instance of harassment or retaliation.”84 
Six months after deciding Citizens United, the Supreme Court issued 
another opinion reaffirming the constitutionality of transparency 
requirements “in the electoral context.”85 In Doe v. Reed,86 the Court 
considered a First Amendment challenge to a Washington State public 
records law that required public disclosure of the names and addresses 
of individuals who signed referendum petitions.87 The particular 
referendum at issue concerned whether to extend certain benefits to 
same-sex couples, but the Court approached the case more broadly and 
focused “not [on] whether disclosure of this particular petition would 
violate the First Amendment, but whether disclosure of referendum 
petitions in general would do so.”88 In a frequently cited concurrence, 
Justice Scalia noted the plaintiffs’ concerns that “disclosure of petition 
signatures may lead to threats and intimidation,” and suggested that while 
the State of Washington could keep petition signatures secret to avoid such 
consequences, it was not constitutionally required to do so, “[a]nd it may 
even be a bad idea.”89 He opined, “[t]here are laws against threats and 
intimidation; and harsh criticism, short of unlawful action, is a price our 
people have traditionally been willing to pay for self-governance. 
Requiring people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic 
courage, without which democracy is doomed.”90 Justice Scalia was 
concerned by the prospect of anonymous political campaigning and 
exercises of direct democracy through ballot initiatives and 
referendums “hidden from public scrutiny and protected from the 
accountability of criticism.”91 “This,” Scalia said, “does not resemble the 
Home of the Brave.”92 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010). 
 86. 561 U.S. 186 (2010). 
 87. Id. at 191. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 219, 228 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 90. Id. at 228. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. In expressing these concerns, Justice Scalia invoked the Court’s earlier 
decision in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, from which he dissented. 514 U.S. 334, 
371–85 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In McIntyre, the Court held that an Ohio 
disclosure statute could not constitutionally be applied to an individual’s in-person 
distribution of homemade handbills advocating her views regarding an imminent 
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Reed, and the Supreme Court’s campaign finance disclosure 
decisions that preceded it, make clear that an entity is not entitled to 
the NAACP exemption in the context of electoral transparency laws 
merely because of general claims of threats or harassment. These cases 
reflect the Court’s recognition of the crucial role electoral 
transparency laws play in our democracy and the high bar that a party 
must meet when it is seeking to deprive voters of important 
information that may affect their electoral choices. 
C.   Lower Court Decisions Underscore the Narrow Scope of the NAACP 
Exemption in the Campaign Finance Context 
Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court’s lead and construed 
the NAACP exemption narrowly when it has been invoked to try to 
avoid electoral transparency requirements. To be sure, not every claim 
for the exemption has been rejected, but other successful claimants 
have had similar public profiles to either the NAACP or Socialist 
Workers Party. In a couple of cases in the early 1980s, lower courts 
granted disclosure exemptions to the Communist Party and an Illinois 
branch of the Socialist Workers Party.93 In one case decided while the 
Brown litigation was pending, an Illinois district court exempted the 
 
referendum on a proposed school tax levy. Id. at 337, 357. The decision emphasized 
the in-person nature of Mrs. McIntyre’s distribution of her handbills and the 
“personally crafted” nature of such election materials and distinguished these 
circumstances from Buckley. Id. at 337, 353–56. McIntyre is an outlier, and the Supreme 
Court has never relied on it as authority in subsequent decisions addressing campaign 
finance disclosure requirements; lower court campaign finance decisions also 
frequently distinguish it. See, e.g., Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182, 1203 n.14 (9th Cir. 
2015); Worley v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 717 F.3d 1238, 1247 (11th Cir. 2013); Ctr. for 
Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 482 (7th Cir. 2012). 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in McIntyre emphasizes the limited scope of the NAACP 
exemption. To the question “whether a ‘right to anonymity’ is such a prominent value 
in our constitutional system that even protection of the electoral process cannot be 
purchased at its expense,” he concluded “[t]he answer . . . is clear: no.” McIntyre, 514 
U.S. at 379. While cases, such as Brown, Bates, and NAACP, held that the disclosure of 
a person’s identity in “peculiar circumstances” would “unconstitutionally deter the 
exercise of the First Amendment,” those cases did not establish a right to anonymity 
or the right of all citizens to ignore the laws under challenge. Id. 
 93. FEC v. Hall-Tyner Election Campaign Comm., 678 F.2d 416, 423 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(exempting the Communist Party from federal campaign finance disclosure 
requirements); 1980 Ill. Socialist Workers Campaign v. Ill. Bd. of Elections, 531 F. 
Supp. 915, 921–22 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (exempting a local branch of SWP—the same 
Socialist Party group that obtained a disclosure exemption in the Socialist Workers 
case—from Illinois disclosure laws). 
2020] SECRET MONEY IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1413 
 
local branch of the Socialist Workers Party after its Chicago office was 
firebombed and burglarized and the group had been surveilled by the 
Chicago Police Department.94 In the other case, the Second Circuit 
exempted the Communist Party from federal campaign finance 
disclosure requirements, finding that it met Buckley’s high bar because 
it was a “disfavored minority part[y]” or “fringe organization[ ]” whose 
very existence would be threatened by disclosure.95 Indeed, the Second 
Circuit cited various state and federal laws, still on the books, that 
subjected members of the Communist Party to civil and criminal 
liability, and concluded that the fear of serious reprisals was sufficiently 
grave to warrant the exemption.96 
Although these decisions granted disclosure exemptions to 
marginalized and targeted fringe political party organizations, lower 
courts have generally refrained from extending the exemption to 
other groups. In particular, lower courts have rejected claims by large, 
well-funded groups who would prefer to keep their donors anonymous 
or who claim that disclosure would expose them to protests and other 
harassment that does not nearly approach the scope or severity 
documented in cases like NAACP and Brown. 
In ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen,97 for example, two political 
committees supporting California’s Proposition 8—which proposed an 
amendment to the California constitution defining marriage as only 
between a man and a woman98—sought an exemption from the state’s 
campaign finance transparency laws. The plaintiffs alleged harassment 
against supporters of Proposition 8, including vandalism of political 
signs, angry protests, unsolicited phone calls, death threats, and 
various forms of economic reprisal.99 
Applying Buckley, the Eastern District of California found that the 
plaintiffs’ claims did not warrant an exemption from the state’s 
disclosure requirements.100 The court invoked the Supreme Court’s 
determination that “disclosure exemptions were primarily intended to 
 
 94. 1980 Ill. Socialist Workers Campaign, 531 F. Supp. at 921. 
 95. Hall-Tyner Election Campaign Comm., 678 F.2d at 419–20. 
 96. Id. at 422–23. 
 97. 830 F. Supp. 2d 914 (E.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d in part, dismissed in part sub nom. 
ProtectMarriage.com-Yes on 8 v. Bowen, 752 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 98. Id. at 916. 
 99. See id. at 917–22 (summarizing in detail plaintiffs’ evidence of threats, 
harassment, and reprisals). 
 100. Id. at 952. 
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combat harms suffered by small, persecuted groups.”101 It also found 
that plaintiffs were far from a fringe organization, having convinced 
over seven million voters to support Proposition 8 (52.3% of the vote), 
raised almost $30 million, and organized a “massive movement” to 
successfully “legislate a concept steeped in tradition and history.”102 
The California district court also distinguished the plaintiffs’ evidence 
of threats, harassment, and reprisals from the “proportionality and 
magnitude” demonstrated in Brown and NAACP.103 Plaintiffs offered 
relatively few instances of serious harassment as compared to the many 
millions who supported their cause.104 The court found that the seriousness 
of the risk to plaintiffs paled in comparison to the systemic private and 
governmental reprisals faced by socialist and communist groups or the 
NAACP.105 It explained that supporters of a “movement to recognize 
marriage in California as existing only between a man and a woman” were 
not similarly situated to the SWP or NAACP plaintiffs in Brown and NAACP; 
“Proposition 8 supporters promoted a concept entirely devoid of 
governmental hostility.”106 The court was thus, “at a loss to find any principled 
analogy between two such greatly diverging sets of circumstances.”107 
Another critical distinction in the ProtectMarriage.com litigation was 
the fact that much of the plaintiffs’ evidence of “harassment” involved 
boycotts and angry protests, displays of dissatisfaction with plaintiffs’ 
cause that were themselves “forms of speech protected by [the First 
Amendment].”108 As the court explained at an earlier stage of the 
litigation, a decision not to patronize a particular establishment or 
business, or to withhold economic resources is “an inherent right of 
the American people” and “individuals have repeatedly resorted to 
boycotts as a form of civil protest intended to convey a powerful 
message.”109 This form of counter speech remains protected, the 
Supreme Court has explained, even where “it may embarrass others or 
 
 101. Id. at 931. 
 102. Id. at 929. 
 103. Id. at 932–33. 
 104. Id. at 933 (“Plaintiffs . . . would need evidence of thousands of acts of reprisals, threats 
or harassment, spanning much more than the short period of time covering California’s 
ballot-initiative process to prove contributors to such a massive group are entitled to 
anonymity of the type justified years ago for the individuals in Brown and NAACP.”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 931–32. 
 107. Id. at 932. 
 108. Id. at 934. 
 109. Id. 
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coerce them into action.”110 Ultimately, the California district court 
concluded that Proposition 8 advocacy organizations did not qualify 
for a disclosure exemption.111 
A federal district court in Washington reached the same conclusion 
in an analogous context in Doe v. Reed. As described in Section II.B, at 
an earlier stage in the Reed litigation, the Supreme Court issued a broad 
holding that requiring disclosure of individuals who sign referendum 
petitions in general is permissible under the First Amendment.112 
When the district court subsequently reached the merits of whether 
mandatory disclosure of signatories to a state referendum to deny 
benefits to same-sex couples violated the First Amendment, the court 
found that Washington’s public records law was constitutional.113 
As in ProtectMarriage.com, the Washington district court first 
determined that the plaintiffs—signors of a referendum petition to 
reject a bill granting new rights to same-sex partners—were not 
similarly situated to the “minor part[ies]” and “fringe organization[s]” 
that obtained exemptions in NAACP, Brown, and the related cases 
concerning the same or similarly situated parties.114 Next, the court 
considered the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ evidence of threats, 
harassment, or reprisals, which included isolated accounts of angry 
speech, offensive gestures and insults, and threatening phone calls, 
among others.115 The court found that plaintiffs’ evidence did not rise 
to the “level or amount” presented in Brown and NAACP.116 
 
 110. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982); see also, e.g., Elian 
Dashev, Note, Economic Boycotts as Harassment: The Threat to First Amendment Protected 
Speech in the Aftermath of Doe v. Reed, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 207, 207 (2011) (arguing that 
courts should not allow “Major Political Players” to use economic boycotts as a 
justification for a disclosure exemption in as-applied challenges); Michael C. Harper, 
The Consumer’s Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware and Its 
Implications for American Labor Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409, 409–10 (1984) (stating that a 
consumer right to boycott is appropriate for society and should be regarded as a 
“broad political right”). 
 111. ProtectMarriage.com, 830 F. Supp. 2d. at 924–25, 936. 
 112. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010). 
 113. Doe v. Reed, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1212–13 (W.D. Wash. 2011). 
 114. Id. at 1203–04. 
 115. Id. at 1205–10 (summarizing in detail plaintiffs’ evidence of threats, 
harassment, and reprisals). 
 116. Id. at 1210, 1212 (“This is a quite different situation than the progeny of cases 
providing an as-applied exemption wherein the government was actually involved in 
carrying out the harassment, which was historic, pervasive, and documented.”). 
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These cases, among others,117 highlight three defining features of 
the disclosure exemption doctrine in the electoral context. 
First, as-applied means as-applied. NAACP does not provide justification for 
invalidating generally applicable campaign finance transparency regimes 
in their entirety, nor does it support new blanket exemptions from 
campaign finance disclosure laws.118 A court’s determination of whether an 
exemption from campaign finance transparency requirements is warranted 
is highly fact dependent.119 
Second, the analysis should consider whether the party seeking a disclosure 
exemption is a “small, persecuted group whose very existence depend[s] on some 
manner of anonymity,” i.e., whether it is similarly situated to the NAACP 
in the 1950s or the Socialist Workers and Communist parties in the 
1970s and 80s.120 
Third, while the allegedly feared threats, harassment, or reprisals need only 
be reasonably probable, the nature of probable harm must be serious. The 
records in NAACP and Brown, for example, included evidence of 
systematic violence and repression faced by the NAACP and Socialist 
Workers Party for years.121 Particularly in the electoral context, where 
 
 117. E.g., Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 807–08 (9th Cir. 2012) (suggesting 
that the exemption will only apply in the “atypical” or “unusual” case); Jones v. 
Unknown Agents of the FEC, 613 F.2d 864, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (describing the 
circumstances meriting a grant of an NAACP exemption to be “limited”). 
 118. See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 201–02 (2010) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim for a 
blanket exemption from the Washington Public Records Act for signors of referendum 
petitions); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam). 
 119. See ProtectMarriage.com-Yes on 8 v. Bowen, 752 F.3d 827, 840 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(“As-applied challenges to contribution disclosure laws are fact-specific in nature.”); 
Averill v. City of Seattle, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1174 n.1 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (“[T]he 
exemption analysis is fact specific and depends on, among other things, the 
surrounding political climate and recent indications of hostility . . . .”); see also Doe v. 
Reed, 697 F.3d 1235, 1248–49 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding a “stark contrast” between 
plaintiffs’ evidence and the evidence presented in Brown); Master Printers of America 
v. Donovan, 751 F.2d 700, 704–05 (4th Cir. 1984) (denying a labor organization an 
exemption from the reporting requirements of the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act (LMRDA) because the record did not establish the kind of “deterrent 
effect” required under Buckley and NAACP). 
 120. ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 830 F. Supp. 2d 914, 928 (E.D. Cal. 2011). See 
FEC v. Hall-Tyler Election Campaign Comm., 678 F.2d 416, 419–20 (2d Cir. 1982); 
Doe v. Reed, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203–04 (W.D. Wash 2011); see also Dale Ho, supra 
note 52, at 435 (“[C]ontext matters: the identity of the party subject to disclosure and 
its relative position in society are relevant factors.”). 
 121. See Family PAC, 685 F.3d at 807–08 (requiring a showing of a “genuine” or “bona 
fide” threat of harassment or retaliation); Doe, 697 F.3d at 1248–49 (requiring plaintiff to 
show “the kind of focused and insistent harassment . . . required in Buckley”). 
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an exemption may result in voters being deprived of information 
relevant to their electoral decisions, the scope and severity of likely 
threats and harassment must be weighty and go beyond boycotts and 
protests that are themselves forms of speech protected by the First 
Amendment.122 It is against this legal backdrop that anti-transparency 
groups are trying to pry open and magnify this limited exemption. 
III.    RECENT EFFORTS TO DISTORT THE NARROW NAACP EXEMPTION 
INTO A NEW GENERAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
Despite courts’ overwhelming recognition of the importance of 
ensuring voters have access to information about who is spending money 
to influence our elections, efforts to conceal political spending—especially 
the spending through corporations that was unleashed by Citizens United—
are on the rise. In particular, powerful, well-funded groups are actively 
seeking to change the law through litigation, policy, and media campaigns 
that misappropriate the concepts of “threats and harassment” from NAACP 
into generalized arguments in favor of secret political spending. 
A.   Recent Lawsuits Seek Broad Decisions Invalidating Disclosure Laws by 
Misconstruing NAACP 
In recent years, anti-disclosure groups have filed lawsuits in which they 
tried—and, in most cases, failed—to recast NAACP as support for claims that 
disclosure requirements are themselves a First Amendment injury. These 
lawsuits mischaracterize NAACP as embracing a broad constitutional right to 
donor privacy and largely disregard the factual context that was central to the 
decision. Fortunately, courts have generally rejected these arguments. 
In 2014, the Center for Competitive Politics (CCP)—a § 501(c)(3) 
nonprofit organization that has since renamed itself the “Institute for Free 
Speech”123—brought a facial challenge to a California rule requiring 
California-registered charities to disclose to state regulators the identities of 
their major donors as reported on a federal tax form (Form 990 Schedule B) 
filed by the charities with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).124 Neither the 
federal requirement nor the state rule requires the charitable donor 
information to be disclosed to the public.125 CCP invoked NAACP and Buckley 
 
 122. See ProtectMarriage.com, 830 F. Supp. 2d. at 934, 952. 
 123. IFS Staff, Center for Competitive Politics Renamed Institute for Free Speech, INST. FOR 
FREE SPEECH (Oct. 25, 2017), http://www.ifs.org/news/center-for-competitive-politics-
renamed-institute-for-free-speech [https://perma.cc/8N7P-4V7P]. 
 124. Ctr. for Competitive Politics v. Harris, 784 F.3d 1307, 1309–10 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 125. See id. 
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as purported support for its “novel theory” that the confidential donor 
disclosure requirement was “in and of itself” an injury to CCP’s First 
Amendment right of association because it would chill its donors’ 
participation.126 CCP argued that the court should weigh that inherent 
injury when analyzing the constitutionality of the reporting requirement.127 
The Ninth Circuit rejected CCP’s argument.128 The court acknowledged 
that disclosure requirements have an inherent potential to substantially 
infringe on the exercise of First Amendment rights in limited 
circumstances.129 But that general inherent risk is not sufficient to warrant 
an exemption; rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate an “actual burden” on 
its right of association, and CCP made no such showing.130 The court also 
rejected CCP’s extensive reliance on NAACP and its progeny, explaining 
that those “as-applied” cases were irrelevant to CCP’s facial challenge.131 
One year later, another group brought a similar constitutional challenge 
to California’s Schedule B requirement, although this lawsuit sought an as-
applied exemption rather than facial invalidation of the law.132 The plaintiff 
seeking as-applied relief was Americans for Prosperity Foundation (AFP 
Foundation), a § 501(c)(3) nonprofit connected to billionaire brothers 
David and Charles Koch.133 Notably, AFP Foundation is related to 
Americans for Prosperity (AFP), a § 501(c)(4) political advocacy 
organization whose resources are so substantial, and whose political 
spending is so massive and widespread, some have suggested it “may be 
America’s third-biggest political party.”134 
 
 126. Id. at 1312–13. 
 127. Id. at 1313–14. 
 128. See id. at 1316 (“[N]o case has ever held or implied that a disclosure 
requirement in and of itself constitutes First Amendment injury.”). 
 129. Id. at 1313. 
 130. Id. at 1314, 1316 (explaining that CCP failed to allege that the non-public 
disclosures would result in any reprisals by a governmental entity and that its assertions 
of inadvertent public disclosure were too speculative). 
 131. Id. at 1312 n.3. 
 132. See Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 903 F.3d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(noting that when the Ninth Circuit ruled against a facial constitutional challenge to 
the Schedule B requirement, it “left open the possibility . . . that a future litigant might 
. . . warrant relief on an as-applied challenge” (citing Ctr. for Competitive Politics, 784 
F.3d at 1317)); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29–32, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. 
Becerra, 2019 WL 4034756 (Aug. 26, 2019) (No. 19-255). 
 133. Ams. for Prosperity Found., 903 F.3d at 1004, 1013. 
 134. See Philip Bump, Americans for Prosperity May Be America’s Third Biggest Political 
Party, WASH. POST (June 19, 2014, 2:32 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
the-fix/wp/2014/06/19/americans-for-prosperity-is-americas-third-biggest-political-
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In its challenge to California’s Schedule B requirement, AFP 
Foundation argued that the confidential disclosure rule would deter 
contributors by subjecting them to threats, harassment, and reprisals in 
the event that state regulators inadvertently leaked Schedule B to the 
public.135 AFP presented evidence that some of its public supporters, 
including the Koch brothers, had endured boycotts, defamatory articles, 
personal threats, and other economic reprisals.136 Ultimately, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the risk of inadvertent public disclosure was so 
slight that there was no reasonable probability that California’s 
confidential disclosure requirement would lead to any such reprisals.137 
The Second Circuit considered substantially identical claims 
challenging New York’s Schedule B disclosure requirements, and it 
reached the same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit.138 The plaintiff, 
Citizens United, argued that New York’s confidential disclosure law, by 
itself, substantially infringed its First Amendment associational 
rights.139 The Second Circuit disagreed, recognizing that although any 
disclosure rule “comes with some risk of abuse,” that “background risk” 
is not itself a constitutional problem, nor is disclosure “itself an evil.”140 
 
party (discussing AFP’s $100 million spending on 2014 election races); see also Nicholas 
Confessore, Koch Brothers’ Budget of $889 Million for 2016 Is on Par with Both Parties’ 
Spending, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01 
/27/us/politics/kochs-plan-to-spend-900-million-on-2016-campaign.html (reporting 
that AFP’s planned spending of almost $900 million on the 2016 campaign was an 
“unparalleled effort by coordinated outside groups to shape a presidential election”); 
Jonathan Easley, Koch Network Launching 4 PACs, Open to Backing Some Dems in 2020, 
HILL (June 7, 2019, 9:11 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/447420-
koch-network-launching-4-new-pacs-in-preparation-for-2020-primary 
[https://perma.cc/QH38-G754] (explaining that AFP, a “sprawling network of 
libertarian-minded donors, philanthropists and activists[,] spent $400 million on 
politics and policy during the 2018 election cycle”); Alexander Hertel-Fernandez et 
al., How the Koch Brothers Built the Most Powerful Rightwing Group You’ve Never Heard of, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2018, 3:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/sep/26/koch-brothers-americans-for-prosperity-rightwing-political-group 
[https://perma.cc/VH6K-4U6B] (highlighting AFP-Wisconsin’s 125,000 grassroots 
activists, which equal “around 2% of the state’s population”); Kenneth P. Vogel, How 
the Koch Network Rivals the GOP, POLITICO: THE KOCH MACHINE (Dec. 30, 2015, 5:17 AM), 
http://bit.ly/31HlPbV [https://perma.cc/27SW-W9RW] (describing AFP’s internal 
workings, massive expenditures, and political clout). 
 135. Ams. for Prosperity Found., 903 F.3d at 1013. 
 136. Id. at 1016–17. 
 137. Id. at 1017–19. 
 138. See Citizens United v. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d 374, 378 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 139. Id. at 383. 
 140. Id. 
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The court explained that “anonymity can protect both those whose 
unpopular beliefs might subject them to retaliation and those who seek 
to avoid detection (and consequences) for deceptive or harmful 
activities that governments have legitimate interests in preventing.”141 
The Second Circuit rejected Citizens United’s attempt to use NAACP 
as a broad sword to strike down transparency laws on their face. Citing 
Buckley and Citizens United, the court noted that NAACP only offers a “shield 
of privacy” when disclosure results in actual restraints on associational 
rights—as measured by a reasonable probability that disclosure will result 
in serious threats, harassment, or reprisals—and when those actual 
restraints outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure.142 
Applying that standard, the Second Circuit also rejected Citizens 
United’s as-applied challenge, noting that the group’s evidence—
“bare assertion[s]” of retaliatory targeting by the New York Attorney 
General—was a “far cry from the clear and present danger that white 
supremacist vigilantes and their abettors in the Alabama state 
government presented to members of the NAACP in the 1950s.”143 
Of course, the confidential disclosure requirements challenged in 
these cases are not entirely parallel to the election transparency 
requirements addressed in Buckley, Brown, Citizens United, and the cases 
addressing same-sex marriage ballot measures. The likelihood of 
threats and retaliation is arguably lower in the context of Schedule B 
rules, which require charitable organizations to disclose their major 
donors to government regulators, but not to the public. Those rules also 
promote some government interests that are not implicated by 
election-spending transparency laws, like enabling the government to 
ensure that charities and other nonprofit groups are complying with 
the requirements that entitle them to their tax exemptions. At the 
same time, Schedule B reporting requirements and campaign finance 
disclosure requirements both help government officials identify fraud 
and other violations of law, including campaign finance law,144 while 
campaign finance disclosure requirements also reduce corruption and 
inform voters about the sources of election spending. 
Regardless of these distinctions, these and other broad legal 
challenges to confidential Schedule B reporting, if successful, threaten 
to undermine campaign finance transparency requirements. Indeed, 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 385. 
 144. See infra notes 154–55 and accompanying text. 
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one district court has already suggested, in dicta, that our current 
divisive political climate, “marked by the so-called cancel or call-out 
culture,” may make it easier for AFP to obtain a disclosure exemption 
today than in the past.145 The mere suggestion that such an enormously 
powerful organization146 could be eligible for an NAACP exemption 
marks a concerning departure from established precedents. 
B.   Legislative and Regulatory Efforts to Eliminate Disclosure Requirements 
Efforts to eliminate or reduce the scope of political transparency laws 
are not limited to litigation. Legislatures and agencies are also pursuing 
policy changes that would override existing disclosure requirements, 
reducing transparency about groups engaged in political spending and 
undermining regulators’ ability to detect and respond to violations of law. 
In the past few years, for example, virtually identical anti-
transparency bills were introduced in Michigan and Mississippi.147 The 
bills included language broadly restricting the ability of state and local 
agencies to require § 501(c) nonprofit organizations to disclose 
information about their members, donors, and supporters—including 
even when the disclosure filings would not be made available to the 
public.148 Importantly, the mandatory concealment of nonprofits’ 
information was not limited to charities and religious organizations 
established under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, but 
extended to § 501(c)(4) “social welfare” organizations, § 501(c)(5) 
labor unions, and § 501(c)(6) trade associations, all of which engage 
 
 145. Ams. for Prosperity v. Grewal, No. 3:19-cv-14228-BRM-LHG, 2019 WL 4855853, 
at *20 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2019). The court ultimately held that New Jersey’s broad 
transparency law, which imposed public donor disclosure requirements on groups that 
spend money to influence elections or to simply provide factual information on 
candidates and ballot issues, was likely unconstitutional on its face and thus avoided 
the question of whether AFP was entitled to an as-applied exemption. Id. 
 146. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 147. An Act to Provide that a Public Agency Shall Not Require Any Entity Organized 
Under Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code to Provide the Public Agency with 
Personal Information, H.B. No. 1205 (Miss. 2019), http://billstatus.ls.s 
tate.ms.us/documents/2019/pdf/HB/1200-1299/HB1205SG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5YG5-JU3V]; Personal Privacy Protection Act, S. 1176, 99th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2018), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2017-2018/ 
billenrolled/Senate/pdf/2018-SNB-1176.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RJE-386P]. 
 148. Miss. H.B. No. 1205; Mich. S. 1176, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
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in extensive amounts of political campaigning and lobbying activity.149 
As one columnist in Mississippi observed, shielding these activities 
from disclosure helps “those who want to buy candidates and influence 
elections who do not want their identities known.”150 
In December 2018, former Michigan Governor Rick Snyder vetoed 
the Michigan bill.151 He characterized it as “a solution in search of a 
problem” and pointed out that the Supreme Court’s longstanding 
NAACP decision already provides as-applied protection to a group facing 
a genuine prospect of harm as a result of disclosure.152 A few months later, 
on April 3, 2019, former Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant signed a nearly 
identical bill into law.153 
The IRS is also considering policy changes that would dramatically 
narrow the scope of tax-exempt organizations that are subject to IRS 
reporting requirements. Under the long-standing existing rule, each 
nonprofit group organized under § 501(c) of the tax code must 
confidentially report to the IRS the identity of all contributors who donate 
$5,000 or more per year to the organization.154 The current rule—which 
created the federal Schedule B that California and New York require state 
charities to file with regulators in those states—serves the same interests 
of enabling the government to identify and address fraud and violations 
 
 149. See Dark Money Basics, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/ 
dark-money/basics [https://perma.cc/A8KT-7A4N] (detailing the operation of political 
nonprofits and super PACs and their covert financial influences on elections). 




 151. Veto Statement for S. 1176, Gov. Rick Snyder (Dec. 28, 2018), S. Journal, 99th 
Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2637 (Mich. 2018), 
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(yvybvzsl35tcqf0nvozbp4h2))/documents/2017-
2018/Journal/Senate/pdf/2018-SJ-12-31-085.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4RZ-F46Y]; see 
Jim Malewitz, Snyder Vetoes Bills Criticized as ‘Power Grabs,’ REC. EAGLE (Jan. 4, 2019), 
https://www.record-eagle.com/opinion/opinion-snyder-vetoes-bills-criticized-
aspower-grabs/article_f6335061-4889-5c5f-ae09-fd8edae6ceb6.html 
[https://perma.cc/QH8P-YB38] (noting that in 2019, Michigan saw an 
“unprecedented influx of cash from so-called dark money groups,” many of which were 
located out of state, in its elections). 
 152. Veto Statement for S. 1176, supra note 151. 
 153. See Miss. Code. Ann. § 25-62-3 (2019) (prohibiting public agencies from 
requiring disclosures from any 501(c) organization). 
 154. Returns and Annual Reports of Exempt Organizations, 36 Fed. Reg. 11,025, 
11,027 (June 8, 1971) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1); see also 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.6001-1(c), 
1.6033-2(a)(2)(iii)(a) (2019). 
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other laws that the Ninth and Second Circuits cited in upholding the 
California and New York requirements.155 
A recently proposed rule would eliminate the federal Schedule B 
reporting requirement for all tax-exempt organizations except 
charities incorporated under § 501(c)(3) and § 527 political 
organizations.156 As explained in comments submitted by the 
nonpartisan Campaign Legal Center, a group of sixteen United States 
Senators, and others,157 the proposed rule would thus enable groups 
like § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations and § 501(c)(6) trade 
associations—organizations that serve as vehicles for hundreds of 
millions of dollars of political spending158—to conceal the sources of 
 
 155. See supra Section III.A; see also Citizens United v. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d 374, 
382 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Collecting donor information on a regular basis from all 
organizations ‘facilitates investigative efficiency,’ and can help [regulators] to ‘obtain 
a complete picture of [the organizations’] operations’ and ‘flag suspicious activity’ 
simply by using information already available to the IRS.”). 
 156. Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting Requirements of 
Exempt Organizations, 84 Fed. Reg. 47,447, 47,451 (proposed Sept. 9, 2019) (to be 
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 157. See Campaign Legal Center, Comment Letter on Guidance Under Section 
6033 Regarding the Reporting Requirements of Exempt Organizations (Dec. 5, 2019), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2019-0039-3096 
[https://perma.cc/VL6T-AFLU] (explaining how the proposed repeal of the 
requirement that certain tax-exempt organizations identify significant donors will 
“effectively invite illegal foreign spending in U.S. elections, cripple future enforcement 
of campaign finance laws, and hamstring efficient tax administration”); U.S. Sen. Amy 
Klobuchar et al., Comment Letter on Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the 
Reporting Requirements of Exempt Organizations (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www. 
regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2019-0039-8319 [https://perma.cc/XG4T-3ML5] 
(expressing “significant concern” that the proposed repeal of IRS nonprofit reporting 
requirement will “undermine[] our political system” and “make[] it easier for foreign 
adversaries to influence our elections”). One comment regarding the proposed rule, 
submitted by U.S. Senators Sheldon Whitehouse, Tom Udall, Richard Blumenthal, 
and Elizabeth Warren, describes the magnitude of this “explosion” of political 
spending by § 501(c)(4) organizations since the Supreme Court issued its Citizens 
United decision. U.S. Sen. Whitehouse et al., Comment Letter on Guidance Under 
Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting Requirements of Exempt Organizations (Dec. 
9, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-2019-0039-8363 [https:// 
perma.cc/EJ2G-PTKL]. They explain that “[s]ince 2010, 501(c)(4) organizations have 
spent over $800 million on political expenditures, compared to $103 million in the 
previous decade.” Id. The Senators note that in 2016, 95 § 501(c) organizations spent 
$50,000 or more on independent election expenditures, totaling $185 million, and 
the ten largest of those ninety-five spenders were responsible for 77% of the total, while 
the top three were responsible for nearly half. Id. 
 158. See Dark Money Basics, supra note 149; see also infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
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that spending not only from the public but also from government 
regulators. The loss of this important oversight mechanism would make it 
much harder to detect abuses of the organizations’ tax exemptions, or to 
determine whether foreign entities are using such organizations to conceal 
unlawful attempts to interfere in American elections.159 
Anti-transparency groups, including organizations who unsuccessfully 
challenged the California and New York Schedule B requirements, are 
urging the IRS to adopt the proposed rule, arguing that existing disclosure 
requirements violate the First Amendment.160 One has renewed the “novel 
theory” that donor disclosure requirements are “in and of [themselves]” 
First Amendment injuries, relying on the same flawed interpretations of 
NAACP and Buckley that the Ninth Circuit rejected.161 Another has invoked 
general concerns about threats, harassment, and reprisals, including 
 
 159. See 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (Supp. 2017) (prohibiting foreign nations from 
contributing to federal, state, and local elections); see also Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 
2d 281, 284 (D.D.C. 2011) (construing the foreign national ban expansively, including 
to prohibit foreign nationals “from making donations to outside groups when those 
donations in turn would be used to make contributions to candidates or parties or to 
finance express-advocacy expenditures”), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012); Brendan Fischer, 
Campaign Finance Law in the 21st Century, in EXAMINING FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN U.S. 
ELECTIONS: A REPORT FROM THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER 12 (2018), https:// 
campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2018-Report-interactive-pages.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5WFX-PN6C] (noting that foreign actors will continue to attempt 
to influence U.S. elections and that “loopholes exploited by foreign actors in the 2016 
elections are certain to be used again”). 
 160. Institute for Free Speech, Comment Letter on Guidance Under Section 6033 
Regarding the Reporting Requirements of Exempt Organizations (Nov. 4, 2019), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=IRS-2019-0039-1645& 
attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/5MP8-HW88] (asserting 
that compelled disclosure of financial contributors to civil society organizations is in 
itself a First Amendment injury); Americans for Prosperity, Comment Letter on 
Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting Requirements of Exempt 
Organizations (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer? 
documentId=IRS-2019-0039-1502&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TPY2-XQHP] (suggesting that donor disclosure has an 
unconstitutional “chilling” effect on free speech and association). 
 161. Compare Institute for Free Speech, supra note 160, with Ctr. for Competitive 
Politics v. Harris, 784 F.3d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting CCP’s argument that 
disclosure requirement, “in and of itself,” harms First Amendment rights, and 
explaining that CCP’s theory “is not supported by [Ninth Circuit] case law or by 
Supreme Court precedent”). 
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“boycotts” and “public shaming,” while arguing that disclosure may 
discourage donations and “drain[] resources.”162 
Efforts to change the law—like the reforms proposed in Michigan and 
adopted Mississippi and the proposed new IRS rule—underscore the multi-
front assault being waged against disclosure rules by organizations and their 
funders who would prefer to keep their political spending secret. These 
attacks on disclosure receive broad support from anti-transparency groups, 
including the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a corporate-
funded organization163 that pairs state legislators with corporate lobbyists to 
craft “model bills” for introduction in the states.164 Legal reform efforts are 
also aided by a parallel public messaging project that seeks to reduce public 
support for political transparency rules165 by frightening people with 
dramatized stories about alleged disclosure-induced threats and harassment. 
 
 162. Americans for Prosperity, supra note 160. But lack of resources is plainly not a 
problem for AFP: its funding is so substantial, it spent hundreds of millions of dollars on 
politics and policy during the 2018 election cycle alone. See supra note 132 and 
accompanying text. 
 163. See Form 990 from Am. Legislative Exch. Council 1, 9 (July 15, 2010), 
https://pdf.guidestar.org/PDF_Images/2009/520/140/2009-520140979-064206f4-
9.pdf [https://perma.cc/NR5M-DBU7] (reporting over $5 million of ALEC’s revenue 
as coming from “other contributions, gifts, [and] grants”); see also Lisa Graves, A CMD 
Special Report on ALEC’s Funding and Spending, CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY’S 
PRWATCH (July 13, 2011, 7:54 AM), https://www.prwatch.org/news/2011/07/10887 
/cmd-special-report-alecs-funding-and-spending [https://perma.cc/PQ5M-WG3D] 
(“Almost 98% of ALEC’s funding comes from corporations like Exxon Mobil, 
corporate ‘foundations’ like the Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation, or trade 
associations like the pharmaceutical industry’s PhRMA and sources other than ‘legislative 
dues.’ Those funds help subsidize legislators’ trips to ALEC meetings, where they are wined, 
dined, and handed ‘model’ legislation to make law in their state.”); Peter Overby, Companies 
Flee Group Behind ‘Stand Your Ground,’ NPR (Apr. 13, 2012, 3:03 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2012/04/13/150528572/as-pressure-mounts-companies-flee-
coalition [https://perma.cc/N6Y5-4V94] (describing ALEC’s practice of developing bills 
“by having state legislators team up with corporate lobbyists” to craft legislation which 
“lawmakers take . . . home to introduce at their state capitols,” and noting that “corporate 
and foundation money” covers nearly all of the organization’s budget). 
 164. See, e.g., Molly Jackman, ALEC’s Influence over Lawmaking in State Legislatures, 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Dec. 6, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/alecs-
influence-over-lawmaking-in-state-legislatures [https://perma.cc/6FM9-N9VP]; John 
Nichols, ALEC Exposed, NATION (July 12, 2011), https://www.thenation.com/ article/alec-
exposed; Nancy Scola, Exposing ALEC: How Conservative-Backed State Laws are All Connected, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/ 
exposing-alec-how-conservative-backed-state-laws-are-all-connected/255869. 
 165. See Sheely Edwards, Bipartisan Poll Finds Voters Want Stronger Enforcement of 
Campaign Finance Laws, Increased Transparency in Elections, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Nov. 
18, 2019), https://campaignlegal.org/index.php/update/bipartisan-poll-finds-voters-
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C.   Attacks on Political-Spending Transparency Through Misleading Public 
Messaging and Fear-Mongering 
A coordinated messaging campaign is disseminating ominous stories 
about the supposed consequences of political donor disclosure laws. 
Although documented cases of harassment stemming from the disclosure 
of a political contribution record are exceedingly rare, these messages 
combine misleading stories with fear-based anti-transparency appeals. 
For example, a group called People United for Privacy disseminates 
professionally produced videos warning of the supposed “dangers” of 
transparency.166 People United for Privacy’s videos often combine 
 
want-stronger-enforcement-campaign-finance-laws-increased [https://perma.cc/BU 
6N-696N] (finding that “[a] majority of voters rate ‘corruption in the political system’ 
as the most serious problem facing the country”). 
 166. See, e.g., People United for Privacy, Supporting Causes Without Fear of Harassment 
and Intimidation, FACEBOOK AD LIBR. (May 17, 2019), https://www.facebook.com 
/ads/library/?id=343848039605693 [https://perma.cc/FH79-KQKK]; People United 
for Privacy, Transparency Is for Government, Privacy Is for People, FACEBOOK AD LIBR. (Mar. 
21, 2019), https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=328470818014968 [https:// 
perma.cc/P42M-MPMQ]. People United for Privacy is a product of closely linked and 
well-funded organizations that have been fighting against reasonable disclosure 
measures across the country for years. See, e.g., AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, DONOR 
DISCLOSURE LEGISLATIVE TOOLKIT 3 (2017), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/ 
2017/09/ALEC-Donor-Disclosure-Legislative-Toolkit-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTY3-
5Q8L] (laying out steps for donors to combat donor disclosure legislation); SEAN 
PARNELL, PHILANTHROPY ROUNDTABLE, PROTECTING DONOR PRIVACY: PHILANTHROPIC 
FREEDOM, ANONYMITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2 (2017), https://www.philanthropy 
roundtable.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/protecting-philanth 
ropic-privacy_white_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5YM-376K] (describing People 
United for Privacy as an “initiative” of State Policy Network); Robert Faturechi, The 
Conservative Playbook for Keeping ‘Dark Money’ Dark, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 4, 2016, 12:45 PM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-conservative-playbook-for-keeping-dark-money-
dark [https://perma.cc/74FP-MGEC]. Organizations like the Competitive Enterprise 
Institute and the Institute for Free Speech, in turn, share and deploy People United for 
Privacy content in their own materials. See, e.g., Institute for Free Speech (@InstFreeSpeech), 
TWITTER (Dec. 18, 2017, 2:17 PM), https://twitter.com/InstFreeSpeech/status/ 
942836251736100865 [https://perma.cc/69K9-WHF6]; Richard Morrison, Unite for Privacy 
and the First Amendment, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Feb. 17, 2017), https://cei.org 
/blog/unite-privacy-and-first-amendment [https://perma.cc/UJK6-EC57]. Leaders of 
organizations like the Goldwater Institute, ALEC, and FreedomWorks have provided 
testimonials for People United for Privacy’s videos. See, e.g., People United for Privacy, 
Testimonial of ALEC CEO Lisa B. Nelson, FACEBOOK AD LIBR. (Feb. 11, 2019), 
https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=2233850430188226 [https://perma.cc/ 
P9S3-G8FB]; People United for Privacy, Testimonial of FreedomWorks President 
Adam Brandon, FACEBOOK AD LIBR. (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.facebook.com/ 
ads/library/?id=852549738421369 [https://perma.cc/T97V-HWH5]. 
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examples of political donors claiming to have experienced harassment 
as a result of their donations with frightening hypothetical 
consequences of donor disclosure.167 But the most frequent examples of 
“harassment” that People United for Privacy and its allies deploy do not 
actually relate to political donor disclosure. 
For example, one video claims that “[i]n Wisconsin, Cindy A. had 
her home raided for support of union reforms,” and that “Erious J. was 
profiled in Oregon after using a #BlackLivesMatter hashtag.”168 The 
Cindy A. example receives additional emphasis in the longer True Story: 
Wisconsin John Doe Victims video featured on its YouTube page,169 which 
features hauntingly lit footage depicting a pre-dawn raid and Cindy 
A.’s retelling of her home being searched one morning. But that raid 
had nothing to do with disclosure of her political donations. Instead, 
her home was searched in connection with a probe into bid-rigging 
during Scott Walker’s pregubernatorial tenure as county executive, 
when Cindy A. served as one of his top aides.170 
Likewise, the “Erious J.” story has nothing to do with disclosing 
Erious J.’s political donations. As Oregon Public Radio describes, 
Erious J. was “caught up in digital surveillance by the [Oregon 
Department of Justice] because he used the #BlackLivesMatter hashtag 
 
 167. See, e.g., People United for Privacy YouTube Channel, YOUTUBE, https://www. 
youtube.com/channel/UCmaYrE5NxTrGZuB6sXUDwlQ [https://perma.cc/X42L-
BEHF] (last updated Dec. 20, 2019); Spread the Word, PEOPLE UNITED FOR PRIVACY, 
http://unitedforprivacy.com/Videos/page/2 [https://perma.cc/MM8L-TXX7]. 
 168. People United for Privacy, Blacklisted, FACEBOOK AD LIBR. (Apr. 25, 2019), 
https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=422863661606480 [https://perma.cc/ 
G86D-33LQ]. This ad generated between 50,000 and 100,000 Facebook user impressions 
over three days. Id. People United for Privacy has also featured this video on Twitter. 
People United for Privacy (@UniteForPrivacy), TWITTER (Apr. 25, 2019, 10:06 PM), 
https://twitter.com/UniteForPrivacy/status/1121596477824995328/video/1 [https:// 
perma.cc/M4F4-G3LR]. 
 169. People United for Privacy, True Story: Wisconsin John Doe Victims, YOUTUBE (Nov. 
27, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o9Owg0wuVyA [https://perma.cc/ 
3MGK-XDDB]. 
 170. See, e.g., Jason Stein, Patrick Marley, Steve Schultze & Daniel Bice, FBI Seizes 
Items at Home of Former Top Aide to Gov. Walker, MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL (Sept. 14, 
2011), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/129801878.html [https:// 
perma.cc/3ZTZ-QBMG]; Dave Umhoefer & Steve Schultze, John Doe Investigation Looks into 
Bids to House County Workers, MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/corruption-investigation-looks-into-bids-
to-house-county-workers-0s3t07c-138020933.html [https://perma.cc/7X9E-3JCG]. 
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and tweeted the well-known logo of the rap group Public Enemy,” and 
he later sued the state for racial profiling.171 
In another misleading video, “Darcy O,”172 described being criticized 
and threatened during a high-profile case that involved the Goldwater 
Institute. “I walked away from this experience with a greater appreciation 
of the importance of being anonymous—of having your information be 
private,” she concluded in the video.173 While “Darcy O.” may have been 
targeted based on her association with the Goldwater Institute, that 
association was not publicized because of her political donations. She was 
CEO of the organization. The people responsible for the activity described 
in the video identified her address through public property records.174 
Anti-transparency stories like these also frequently exaggerate the 
consequences of a donor’s disclosure. In one commonly invoked example, 
we learn that Margie Christofferson “lost her job” after being disclosed as a 
donor to the pro-Proposition 8 ballot measure committee, which supported 
amending the California constitution to define marriage as only between a 
man and a woman.175 Stories about Christofferson cite the loss of her job, 
boycotts of her restaurant, and public criticism she experienced. But even 
setting aside that boycotts and criticism are protected by the First 
Amendment,176 these stories omit that Christofferson, who was the 
 
 171. Andrew Dorn, Johnson Says Oregon DOJ Didn’t Show ‘Loyalty’ in Civil Rights Case, OPB 
(Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.opb.org/radio/programs/thinkoutloud/segment/oregon-
civil-rights-attorney-settlement-erious-johnson-interview [https:// perma.cc/28UB-7ZDU]. 
 172. People United for Privacy, Darcy’s True Story: Death Threats, Violence, and 
Intimidation, YOUTUBE (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cGRl-
gsqChQ&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/9LC3-ZXKT]. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See, e.g., John Marshall, Goldwater Institute Files Lawsuit in Coyotes Deal, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 13, 2012), http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/sports/ 
goldwater-institute-files-lawsuit-in-coyotes-deal/article_b43e25b6-b584-11e1-99c2-
001a4bcf887a.html [https://perma.cc/E4K2-GM2D]; Tracie Sharp & Darcy Olsen, 
Beware of Anti-Speech Ballot Measures, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/beware-of-anti-speech-ballot-measures-1474586180?mod=searchresults&page 
=1&pos=2 (stating explicitly that the “hockey fans used property tax records to find 
the home address of the institute’s president, Ms. Olsen, and post it online”). 
 175. True Stories of Harassment and Intimidation, PEOPLE UNITED FOR PRIVACY, 
http://unitedforprivacy.com/true-stories-of-harassment-and-intimidation 
[https://perma.cc/H3MZ-YTU2]. 
 176. See, e.g., supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text. As one article explained, 
many of the restaurant’s employees and customers were gay, and the boycott expressed 
opposition to Christofferson’s support for a ballot measure that would “strip their 
rights.” Lisa Derrick, El Coyote Boycott? Mormon Manager’s Faith Overrides “Love” for 
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restaurant owner’s daughter, returned to her job after voluntarily resigning 
for a brief period—she was not fired as the references to “losing” her job 
imply.177 Now, she owns the restaurant.178 
Millions of political contribution records have been made public since 
the 1970s, yet as these examples illustrate, even groups that are highly 
motivated to highlight instances of harassment resulting from 
individuals’ political contributions seem to have a difficult time finding 
legitimate examples. 
CONCLUSION 
More than half a century of Supreme Court jurisprudence 
conclusively establishes that the government may constitutionally 
require transparency about spending to influence the American 
political process. More precisely, ensuring transparency about election-
related spending—including who is bankrolling the groups that spend money 
on elections—promotes First Amendment interests by allowing voters to 
make informed decisions at the ballot box. 
The Supreme Court has also recognized that in certain narrow 
circumstances, groups that lack political or economic power may face such 
substantial threats or harassment as a result of complying with disclosure 
requirements that a disclosure exemption is necessary to protect the 
groups’ ability to exercise their First Amendment right to associate. But 
such circumstances are limited and do not include donors’ mere 
preference to remain anonymous. Nor are generalized fears of 
boycotts, protests, and other First-Amendment-protected counter 
speech an adequate basis to keep the sources of political spending 
secret. Powerful, well-funded organizations like AFP are not similarly 
situated to groups like the NAACP in the civil rights era or the Socialist 
Workers Party in the early 1980s. AFP and other large, highly 
 
Customers, HUFFPOST (Dec. 14, 2008, updated Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com 
/entry/el-coyote-boycott-mormon_b_143605 [https://perma.cc/2HWE-YET6]. 
 177. Lisa Derrick, Margaritas Flow Again: El Coyote Manager Resigns Over Prop 8, 
HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017) (“Christoffersen tended her resignation to her mother, 
Grace Salisbury, described on El Coyote Web site as the ‘matriarch’ of the restaurant.”) 
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prepares-for-massive-cinco-de-mayo-party [https://perma.cc/K2V9-8A52]. 
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influential organizations do not need “the special protection of 
anonymity in order for [their] voice[s] or views to be heard.”179 
Finally, unique features of our current environment make effective 
political transparency requirements more critical today than ever 
before. Since the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United, it 
has become increasingly easy for corporations, special interests, 
wealthy individuals, and even foreign nationals to direct unlimited 
amounts of secret “dark” money into our elections.180 The dramatic shift 
of political advertising away from broadcast media to the internet has 
also created new opportunities to conceal the sources of election 
spending, because many federal and state transparency laws have a 
digital blind spot that leaves most digital political ads unregulated.181 
These developments mean it is already too easy to evade transparency 
laws. Yet efforts to strengthen campaign finance transparency 
requirements through legislation and regulation remain in limbo,182 
 
 179. Dale Ho, supra note 52, at 435 (making this point about “the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, with its three hundred thousand members representing three million 
businesses and $140 million in annual contributions”). 
 180. For more detailed analyses of the origins and effects of dark money spending 
on American elections, see, e.g., Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, The History of 
Undisclosed Spending in U.S. Elections & How 2012 Became the “Dark Money” Election, 27 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383 (2013); Daniel C. Kirby, Note, The Legal 
Quagmire of IRC § 501(c)(4) Organizations and the Consequential Rise of Dark Money in 
Elections, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 223 (2015); Dark Money Basics, supra note 149; Richard 
L. Hasen, The Decade of Citizens United: It’s Hard to Overstate the Impact of This One 
Devastating Case on the Past 10 Years of American Politics, SLATE (Dec. 19, 2019), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/12/citizens-united-devastating-impact-
american-politics.html [https://perma.cc/QW5T-HYPJ]. 
 181. See, e.g., CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, DIGITAL AD DISCLOSURE: STOP SECRET 
SPENDING IN THE DIGITAL WORLD, https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2019-
12/Toolkit%20-Digital%20Ad%20One%20Pager%20-%2011.21.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/KLR2-CA4C]; Internet Communication Disclaimers and Definition of “Public 
Communication,” 83 Fed. Reg. 12864, 12865–68 (proposed Mar. 26, 2018) (describing 
existing rules for disclaimers on political ads and the FEC’s past application of 
disclaimer exemptions to certain internet ads); see also, e.g., Sara Swann, The Struggle Is 
Real: FEC Stalled on Regulations for Online Political Ads, FULCRUM (Aug. 22, 2019), 
https://thefulcrum.us/open-government/fec-no-internet-ad-regulation 
[https://perma.cc/DGM3-EQDW]. 
 182. See For the People Act of 2019, H.R. Rep. No. 116-15, pt. 1 (2019); Ella Nilsen, 
House Democrats Just Passed a Slate of Significant Reforms to Get Money out of Politics, VOX (Mar. 
8, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/3/8/18253609/hr-1-pelosi-house-democrats-anti-
corruption-mcconnell [https://perma.cc/KH3K-9TWC] (reporting that H.R. 1, which 
includes provisions “aimed at getting money out of politics and increasing 
2020] SECRET MONEY IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1431 
 
while the multi-front assault on existing transparency regimes is 
escalating. It is thus more important now than ever to protect voters’ First 
Amendment rights by ensuring that the NAACP exemption remains the 
narrow exemption it was intended to be, rather than a new mechanism 
for wealthy special interests to influence the political process in secret. 
 
transparency around donors” is “already dead on arrival in the Senate”); Swann, supra 
note 181 (discussing stalled FEC rulemaking for digital political ad disclaimers). 
